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Abstract
We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what
role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments
implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demon-
strates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their
demands, creates incentives for all players to build reputations for be-
ing hard bargainers. The data are qualitatively consistent with the
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theory, as subjects mimic induced types. Furthermore, we find evi-
dence for the presence of complementary types, whose initial demands
acquiesce to induced behavioral demands. However, there are quanti-
tative deviations from the theory: subjects make aggressive demands
too often and participate in longer conflicts before reaching agree-
ments. Overall, the results suggest that the Abreu and Gul (2000)
model can be used to gain insights to bargaining behavior, particu-
larly in environments where the process underlying obstinate play is
well established.
1 Introduction
Since bargaining is the process through which many agreements are reached
within the economy, it has been an active area of research in political science
and industrial relations, and among theoretical, empirical and experimental
economists. A common feature of many bargaining situations is that bar-
gaining parties attempt to increase their share of the surplus by claiming
they are committed to a particular bargaining position.1 Such commitment
tactics have been recognized as not only an important factor in determining
bargaining outcomes, but also as a source of conflict. Consequently, under-
standing the role of commitment and reputation in the bargaining process
not only provides a potential explanation for the differences in allocations
received by agents, but may also account for the inefficiencies that result
from delay and disagreement.2
Such posturing has been incorporated into a number of bargaining models,
including the classical non-cooperative theory of Rubinstein (1982). This
literature has culminated in the model of bargaining and reputation by Abreu
and Gul (2000).3 In their stylized game, players bargain in two stages. In the
1The classic essay by Schelling (1960) developed the literature on strategic commit-
ment, documenting many examples of such behavior.
2In the current context, commitment is understood to mean that an agent can only
agree to a predetermined outcome or set of outcomes. Commitment does not result from
the timing protocol and differs from Stackelberg leadership. Reputation in this paper
refers to incomplete information over whether a player is committed to some predetermined
outcome or set of outcomes. This arises since there is uncertainty about the types of both
players, which differs from models (and much of the previous experimental literature) in
which only one actor can build a reputation.
3The role of strategic commitment was first formulated into a non-cooperative model
by Crawford (1982). Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987, 1988) were among the first to
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first stage, the two players choose their bargaining positions, that is the share
of the pie they demand. If the two positions are compatible with each other,
the game ends. If not, no further offers are allowed, and the players enter
the second stage: a continuous-time concession game. The second stage ends
when one player concedes to the demand of the other. Reputation enters
through the possibility that a player is behavioral. A behavioral player will
never concede to any offer that does not give them at least the amount that
they demanded in the first stage.4
In this paper, we implement this stylized bargaining model in the labo-
ratory to investigate the role of commitment and reputation in bargaining
environments. Although the two-stage format may appear very abstract, the
design has the advantage of eliminating a potential confound on bargaining
power, namely proposer power, that arises in other protocols. This abstrac-
tion allows the experiment to focus on the role played by reputation in gen-
erating bargaining power, while providing the structure needed for testable
predictions on players’ strategies. The symmetric setting also provides a ten-
sion between following the simple 50-50 bargaining norm, which is fair and
efficient, and the demands of reputation, which can lead to unequal offers
and delay in equilibrium. Furthermore, Abreu and Gul (2000) demonstrate
with their convergence result that bargaining power based on reputation,
as in the stylized game, is the underlying strategic interaction for a general
class of bargaining environments, as one abstracts from the particulars of the
bargaining protocol.5
Viewing the strategic interaction in the stylized two-stage format offers
a fresh perspective on the bargaining problem, one that has not previously
been brought to the laboratory. Indeed, the experiments reveal new insights
into subject behavior: first, there is more conflict than in previous bargain-
ing studies; second, subjects fight for their demands longer than predicted,
and third, while there is clear evidence that subjects recognize the role of
reputation in this environment, they tend to be more demanding in their
incorporate two-sided reputation.
4The r-insistent types of Myerson (1991) is an example of the earlier use of such types.
5The convergence result connects the equilibrium outcomes of the stylized game with
that of the limit of discrete-time bargaining games, as the time between bargaining rounds
goes to zero. This result allows for a general class of bargaining protocols, including
alternating offers as a special case. Consequently, as the time between bargaining rounds
becomes smaller, the dominant factor for outcomes is reputation, as captured by the
stylized game, rather than some feature of the protocol.
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announcements than predicted. In all cases, these observations result in less
equality and less efficiency. This contrasts with much of the prior experi-
mental literature on bargaining, where increasing equality and efficiency are
the two primary forces identified as generating deviations from equilibrium
predictions.
While the theoretical considerations outlined above motivated our interest
in testing the stylized game in the laboratory, it does not motivate the ad-
dition of irrationality in the model. The formulation of the behavioral types
permits a tractable model that highlights the role of strategic posturing and
delivers delay as an equilibrium outcome.6 There are several ways in which
to view these types. First, these types are genuinely boundedly rational, in
the sense that they are obstinate, or follow a rule of thumb or bargaining
convention that has evolved outside the current model. Indeed there is ex-
perimental support for such an interpretation. An example of such behavior
is the observation of disadvantageous counter-offers identified by Ochs and
Roth (1989). Following a rejection in alternating-offer bargaining games with
a shrinking pie, the counter-offer often gives less to the subject that rejected
the initial offer. This is despite the fact that the counter-offer is made by that
very same subject. The types introduced in Abreu and Gul (2000) would also
make disadvantageous counter-offers in such environments. An alternative
interpretation of these types is that they result from actions, taken before
the bargaining process has begun, that could potentially commit a player to
being unable to accept less than a certain outcome.7 In both cases, either
bounded rationality or commitment actions, there is the possibility that ei-
ther player is irrevocably bound to a demand. The current study will not
attempt to determine the nature of behavioral types in the population, but
rather, will focus on the extent to which behavior accords to the theory given
their presence.
An empirical investigation of the model is of interest, not only for its novel
perspective on the bargaining problem, but also for the impact it has had
on the economics literature. In addition to studies that have proposed the-
oretical extensions – for example, Wolitzky (2012) and Atakan and Ekmekci
(2014) – the results have been applied to a diverse range of topics: insights
6See Crawford (1982) for an exposition on the need for both uncertainty and irrevoca-
bility in a bargaining model with commitment and delay.
7See Muthoo (1999) or Kambe (1999) for models that demonstrate that incomplete
information over whether such actions have been taken and their availability, leads to a
similar environment to that in Abreu and Gul (2000).
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from the model have extended the literatures on negotiations (Damiano et al.
2012), political competition over entitlements (Baron 2003), banking (Povel
2005), auction markets (Kwiek 2011), and issues arising in imperfectly com-
petitive search markets (O¨zyurt 2011). The laboratory is particularly suited
for our investigation given a number of challenges that would arise with field
data: first, the predictions of the model rely on knowledge of the sample
distributions of both rational and behavioral types. Second, to distinguish
between alternative motives for conflict and delay, it is necessary to identify
the potential types of the agents and their payoff functions. Finally, it is
difficult to imagine a natural experiment where everything but the possibil-
ity for building reputation remains constant. In the laboratory it is possible
to create a controlled environment where the number and the demands of
behavioral types are the sole difference between sessions, thereby providing
a direct test of the theory.
The paper presents analyses from six treatments that differ in two di-
mensions. The first is the demands that can be made: either any feasible
demand (the unrestricted design) or only a predetermined subset (the re-
stricted design). The second is the introduction of computer players that
follow a pre-specified strategy (referred to as induced behavioral types).8
The unrestricted design aims to determine if the subjects recognize the role
of posturing in bargaining.9 This will be the first, and in our view the key,
comparative static: do the subjects mimic the induced behavioral types when
rational agents are predicted to do so. Although this is a fairly basic test
8In each design there is one treatment with no induced types and two treatments with
induced types; the treatments with induced types differ in the number and behavior of
these types. We induce certain behavioral types to provide experimental control over the
predictions of the model. In Roth and Schoumaker (1983) subjects also bargain with
computers, but they are not aware of it. Other experiments involving computer players,
but in different strategic settings, include Andreoni and Miller (1993), Anderhub et al.
(2002) and Grosskopf and Sarin (2010), among others.
9In this model, such comparative static predictions depend on the specific distribution
of behavioral types. One of the innovations of this paper is to recover a distribution of
behavioral types consistent with the behavior in the treatment without induced behavioral
types (i.e. amongst the subjects) to confirm that the comparative static of interest applies
to our data. This novel combination of structural estimation and experimental design
generates testable predictions in a model that is otherwise too flexible to generate such
predictions without stronger ex-ante assumptions on the behavior of subjects. In addition,
the estimation does not rely on the addition of an arbitrary noise structure: any demand
observed can be generated with some strictly positive probability within the original model
for appropriately selected parameters.
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of the theory, laboratory data routinely reject basic predictions of standard
models, and in this case the prediction runs counter to other decision heuris-
tics, such as the 50-50 norm. Under the restricted design, subject demands
are restricted to a set with just three or four alternatives. In all but one
baseline treatment, this set corresponds to the demands made by induced
types, to ensure that the set of behavioral types in the treatment is common
knowledge for all subjects. These modifications allow us to conduct more
precise tests of the finer details of the model, in particular with regard to the
length of delay and the pattern of concession in the second stage.
Our results provide clear qualitative support that subjects recognize the
role of strategic posturing by mimicking behavioral types: across treatments
there is an increase in subject demands that correspond to induced types
predicted to be mimicked. In addition, the experiment reveals behavior that,
although not predicted by this model, is consistent with an evolutionary
extension of the model. Namely, we find evidence for the presence of comple-
mentary types (Abreu and Sethi 2003), whose initial demand instantaneously
acquiesce to induced obstinate demands.
There are quantitative differences between the observed behavior and sev-
eral of the finer details of the model, in particular with the length of delay and
the pattern of concession in the second stage play. We conjecture that these
deviations are due, in part, to some uncertainty over the set of behavioral
types in the subject population. The behavior in the restricted design ses-
sions with induced types is mostly consistent with this hypothesis, although
some disparities do persist: subjects appear to be disproportionately mim-
icking the most demanding type in the first stage, and delays in the second
stage remain longer than predicted. We propose a minor modification to the
assumed behavior of obstinate types that results in predictions with more de-
manding first-stage announcements and greater delay, thus accommodating
the identified disparities.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a
brief review of the related experimental literature. Section 3 outlines the
theory behind a symmetric version of the bargaining and reputation model
implemented in the laboratory, and highlights the relevant predictions from
this model. Section 4 introduces the experimental design. Section 5 presents
the results, a discussion of which is given in section 6. A final section draws
the main conclusions.
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2 Related Experimental Literature
The results presented in this paper relate to experimental studies of bargain-
ing, reputation and war of attrition models.10 With regard to bargaining,
a large literature has documented observations of norm-driven behavior by
subjects. For instance in bilateral bargaining, agents frequently agree on
rather egalitarian outcomes in situations where the standard model, with
purely selfish preferences, predicts rather unequal outcomes. In his summary
of the literature, Roth (1995) also notes a number of observable regularities
in bargaining regarding the establishment of focal points, what determines
credible bargaining positions, and the role of subjects’ expectations of one
another as they develop during sessions.11
These experimental findings led to the development of models incorpo-
rating other-regarding preferences, which initially focussed on concerns for
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).12
This literature points in a different direction from the research of Roth and
his co-authors and suggests a different cause for conflicts in bargaining: fair-
ness preferences or feelings of spite, rather than strategic posturing.13 Finally,
there is a related experimental literature on bargaining impasses in negotia-
tions, which postulates that such impasses can result from subjects conflating
fairness and best interest (see for instance Babcock and Loewenstein 1997).
The experimental literature on reputation building has focussed mainly
on testing models of one-sided incomplete information in a repeated game
setting. A series of experiments have tested the sequential equilibrium pre-
10To the best of our knowledge, the war of attrition game has received very little atten-
tion in the experimental literature, and has not been implemented in the manner in which
it is here. However, there is a formulation that can be represented as an all-pay auction
(Bulow and Klemperer 1999), which has been the subject of a number of experimental
studies that are surveyed in Ho¨risch and Kirchkamp (2010).
11Studies by Roth et al. (1981), Roth and Murnighan (1982), Roth and Schoumaker
(1983) have shown that, by increasing the number of norm focal points (besides 50/50),
experimental outcomes become less concentrated at 50/50 and increase the probability
that the bargainers will fail to reach an agreement.
12This continues to be an active area of research, with the role of intentions (Charness
and Rabin 2002) receiving increasing attention. See Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) for
a review of this literature.
13For example, Falk et al. (2003) examine reputation in ultimatum games defined as the
recent history of acceptance/rejection of past offers. They conclude that, while it changes
the outcome, the effect of reputation is to reduce the proposers’ uncertainty about the
responders’ acceptance thresholds.
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dictions of variants of the borrower-lender (trust) game, which was first im-
plemented in the laboratory by Camerer and Weigelt (1988).14 Using a re-
peated trust game, Wilson and Eckel (2006) present evidence that high levels
of trust may simply be an investment in a subject’s own reputation. In a
related market environment, Bohnet et al. (2005) demonstrate that providing
feedback, which allows players to observe their partner’s history, improves the
functioning of the market since participants are found to learn the mechanics
of reputation building by imitation. Anderhub et al. (2002) use computers to
induce the probability of facing a second mover who always reciprocate in a
trust game. They conclude that reputation formation provides a reasonable
account of their data.
While there are several differences in theoretical structure from these
earlier experiments, the most important is that the model implemented in
the experiments presented here has two-sided incomplete information. This
means that the incentive to build reputation is symmetric, as is the need to
incorporate the other player’s incentive to build reputation into one’s own
strategy. An earlier experiment that does incorporate two-sided incomplete
information is that by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In their study of a
repeated hold-out game, a move of nature at the beginning of a match de-
termines the types of the two subjects, which in turn determines which stage
game they are playing. An important behavioral implication of their equilib-
rium is for subjects to infer from the history of play which stage game they
are playing, a feature that does not have a direct analog in the Abreu and
Gul (2000) model. Overall, this strand of the literature observes a broad
notion of reputation building by subjects in their respective environments.15
However, the finer details of sequential equilibrium predictions can often fail
to be borne out in the data.
In addition, it is unclear whether the evidence of reputation building in
these other environments will translate to a general bargaining situation. A
broad interpretation of the results from previous studies of one-sided repu-
tation would suggest that subjects would be inclined to mimic the first stage
demands of behavioral types, which corresponds to reputation building in the
current context. However, reputation building in our experiments will not
14See Neral and Ochs (1992), Brandts and Figueras (2003) and Grosskopf and Sarin
(2010). Jung et al. (1994) use a similar design but test the chain store game. Tests of the
repeated trust game also include Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004).
15An exception is Brandts and Figueras (2003) who find that the predictions of the
sequential equilibrium do not organise their results well.
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always align itself with adherence to some common bargaining norm (such
as the 50-50 split), yet following such a norm will always be an available, and
more efficient, option for subjects. Consequently, although experiments of
one-sided reputation models have found some support, it is not clear that this
will extend to a model such as the one considered here where the equilibrium
predictions run counter to both the norms of fairness and efficiency.
3 Summary of the Theory
This section provides an overview of the relevant theoretical results for a
symmetric version of the stylized bargaining and reputation model of Abreu
and Gul (2000).16 Two agents bargain over a pie of size one in two stages.
In the first stage (at time 0) each player simultaneously announces a demand
αi (i.e. the faction of the pie they would like). If the two demands are
compatible (i.e. α1 + α2 ≤ 1) then the game ends immediately.17 If the
two demands are incompatible, the game proceeds to stage two, where a
continuous-time concession game with an infinite horizon starts. That is,
for each point in time, t ∈ [0,∞), both players can choose to accept (i.e.
concede) or hold out. If player i concedes, then player i receives 1−αj, while
if j concedes, player i receives αi. Preferences of agents are risk neutral, with
a common discount factor r. Thus, if an agreement is reached at time t in
which an agent receives a share x, then that player’s payoff is e−rtx.
In addition, there is some probability that a player may face a behavioral
type who is obstinate in their demands. Define C := {α1, ..., αK} as the set
of behavioral types, with αi < αi+1, for i = 1, ..., K − 1, and αK ≥ 12 . An
αk-type always demands αk and only accepts an offer that gives them at least
αk. The probability that a player is an αk-type is zk, for k = 1, ..., K. The
16What is contained here is implicit in Abreu and Gul (2000), whose stylized game
differs slightly to our experimental implementation in that it is not symmetric – in par-
ticular, initial announcements are made sequentially and players can have different sets
of behavioral types (with different distributions over these sets). Some results for equilib-
rium announcements are drawn from Abreu and Sethi (2003), where the authors use the
symmetric version of the model, as implemented here – that is, players make initial an-
nouncements simultaneously and have a common set of behavioral types (and distribution
over this set).
17If the announcements sum to strictly less than one, a sharing rule is used for the
remainder. While other sharing rules can be accommodated, in the experiments we divide
the remainder equally.
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probability that a player is rational is denoted by z0 = 1 −
∑K
k=1 zk. This
distribution over types is summarized by the vector z = {z1, ..., zK}. Last,
a behavioral type is defined as aggressive if it is incompatible with all other
behavioral types in C and weakly incompatible with itself.
3.1 Equilibrium Behavior
A key property of the equilibrium is that a rational player would only choose
a demand that mimics some behavioral type (i.e. αi ∈ C for i = 1, 2). To
do otherwise would instantly reveal the rationality of the actor and result in
their opponent appropriating any gains from trade. Consequently, players
can be identified by the element of C that they announce in the first stage,
αk, αl ∈ C. In a symmetric equilibrium, define µk to be the probability that
a rational player announces demand αk to mimic the behavior of αk. Given
this symmetric equilibrium, the probability that a player is irrational given
an announcement αk is given by
pik =
zk
zk + z0µk
(1)
In equilibrium, with a general set C, rational players will employ a mixed
strategy over announcing different types in the first stage. If the set C con-
tains a type, α, such that α ≤ 1
2
, there is a possibility that this type will
not be replicated in the equilibrium mixed strategy. However, if a behav-
ioral type is replicated, then all more aggressive types are also replicated. As
such, the support of the equilibrium mixing strategy, µ, will be of the form
{αR, ..., αK}, where 1 ≤ R < K. Ensuring that rational players are indiffer-
ent between announcing any αk (for k = R, ...,K), along with the µ being a
probability measure (and therefore summing to one), yields the (K −R + 2)
equations needed to solve for µ and the expected payoff for rational players.18
Suppose a rational player announced αk and faces an opponent who has
announced αl, where αk +αl > 1, causing the players to move on to the con-
cession stage.19 The unique equilibrium play in the incomplete information
18Both the support of µ and the expected payoff are uniquely determined by the parame-
ters (C, z). However, calculating these requires solving this system of non-linear equations,
which only has a numerical solution except for trivial cases. Section 1.7 of the online ap-
pendix contains details of the numerical strategy used to solve this system of equations
for a general set of behavioral types.
19Note that the player who announced αl could be either an αl-type or a rational player
who has mimicked the αl-type.
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war of attrition game is given by a mixed strategy over the time of concession.
The αk-player concedes with constant hazard rate, λkl, given by
20
λkl =
r (1− αk)
αk + αl − 1 (2)
over the interval [0, T0], where T0 = min (Tkl, Tlk) and Tkl =
− ln(pik)
λkl
and
Tlk =
− ln(pil)
λlk
. Thus, equilibrium is generally characterized by inefficient
delay. Concession by the αk-rational player is governed by the distribution
function Fˆkl
1−pik , where
Fˆkl (t) =
{
1− ckle−λklt, for t ∈ [0, T0]
1− pik, for t > T0 (3)
and ckl = pike
λklT0 and (1− ckl) (1− clk) = 0. Note that the distribution func-
tion is expressed in terms of Fˆkl for notational convenience: a rational player
who announced αl, when their opponent announced αk, faces a “mixed”
strategy over the time of concession given by Fˆkl (i.e. without knowing if the
αk-player is rational).
The value of Tkl is a measure of the αk-rational player’s “strategic” weak-
ness when facing an αl-player: if Tkl > Tlk, then the αk-player will concede at
time t = 0 with strictly positive probability (mass), given by qkl = (1− ckl).
Such concession is referred to as initial concession. Concession resulting from
the continuous part of the distribution function is referred to as interior con-
cession. Finally, revisiting the first stage, if a type is aggressive then it is
always replicated in equilibrium and never conceded to initially by another
player.
3.2 Key Equilibrium Predictions
Although the exact nature of equilibrium play by rational players - and the
consequent equilibrium outcomes – is dependent in a non-linear manner on
the set of behavioral types (C) and the distribution over these types (z),
20So long as it remains possible that their opponent is a rational type, a rational player
who announced αk is indifferent between conceding and not conceding at a time t if
r (1− αl) = [αk − (1− αl)]λlk, where λlk is the hazard rate for concession by the oppo-
nent without knowing whether the opponent is rational or not. Equation 2 ensures this
indifference holds.
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there are a number of features of equilibrium behavior that hold more gen-
erally.21 With regard to first-stage announcements made by rational players,
the following can be said:
1. Rational players will only make announcements that mimic some be-
havioral type.
2. If the announcement of a behavioral type is mimicked in equilibrium,
then the announcements of all more demanding behavioral types are
also mimicked.
3. Aggressive types are always mimicked in equilibrium.
4. If the set C contains only aggressive types, then
αk > αl =⇒ µk <
(
zk
zl
)
· µl
That is, if the less demanding type is at least as probable as the more
demanding type, then rational players will mimic the more demanding
announcement less often.
5. If the set C contains a type that is compatible with all other types in
C (i.e., α + αi ≤ 1, for all αi ∈ C), then this type is never mimicked
by rational players.
With regard to second-stage behavior by rational players in the subgame
following announcements αL and αH , where αH + αL > 1 and αL ≤ αH :22
6. If αL = αH or if both αL and αH are aggressive, there is no initial
concession by either player.
7. If αL < αH , then the rational player who initially announced αL would
not concede initially. Whether a rational αH-announcer would initially
concede depends on the full solution of the first stage equilibrium mix-
ing strategy. However, this will generally be the case if αH is not
aggressive.
21See sections 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 of the online appendix for further details on the theoretical
predictions for announcement behavior, delay and concession behavior.
22Throughout the paper, the term subgame is used to refer to the information set reached
following incompatible first-stage announcements. This notation is an abuse of terminol-
ogy, since the incomplete information means these are not proper subgames, but is used
for expositional ease.
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8. Since αL < αH implies that λLH < λHL, the more demanding αH-
announcers concede at a slower rate than the αL-announcers for interior
concession (without conditioning on the players being rational or not).
Consequently, it is more likely that an αL-announcer makes an interior
concession than an αH-announcer.
9. The upper bound on the average (mean) delay, given that agreement
is eventually reached, is 1
λLH+λHL
.
4 Experimental Design
In order to implement the stylized game in the lab, there are three features of
the model that need to be induced. First, computer players are used to gain
some control over the set of behavioral types and the distribution over this
set. The computer players are programmed to follow a fixed α−rule and to
never concede in the second-stage. To make this information common knowl-
edge among the subjects, the rule and the probability of being matched with
a computer player is included explicitly in the instructions.23 Second, fol-
lowing the tradition of Roth and Malouf (1979), risk neutral preferences are
induced using the lottery method. During the experiment, subjects bargain
for probability points, as opposed to monetary amounts; a binary lottery is
conducted at the end of the session, where the probability of winning is given
by the number of probability points won during the session as a fraction of
the total possible number of points.24 Third, to induce the common discount
rate, the pie is shrunk continuously over time according to the rate r = 0.01
per second.
The experiments were conducted at the CESS laboratory at NYU us-
ing undergraduate students from all majors, who were recruited through
e-mails. All treatments were implemented using a between subjects design.
Instructions were read to students aloud and they interacted solely through
23An alternative would have been to use human subjects who have a different payoff
structure, namely they receive α points if and only if they get α in the bargaining and 0
otherwise. Since it is not clear what subjects would actually do in this situation, computer
players were used instead to maintain control over the environment. Furthermore, the
alternative would generate concerns regarding what other subjects believe about how
these subjects would choose to behave.
24This method induces risk neutral preferences over probability points, regardless of the
subject’s attitudes towards risk in monetary payoffs.
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computer terminals.25 The unrestricted design was as follows: Subjects were
randomly matched in pairs, then simultaneously placed a demand (between
0 and 30). If the demands they made were compatible with the demand of
the person they were matched with (that is, summed to 30 or less), then
the round ended and each subject earned their demand plus half of any
remainder. If the demands were incompatible, then that match moved on
to a second stage. This stage proceeded in continuous time, with subjects
having the option to choose to concede. If either they or the person they
were matched with conceded then the round ended. The subject who con-
ceded earned 30 points minus the demand of the player with whom they
were matched with, all multiplied by the discount factor for the amount of
time taken to reach an agreement (e−0.01t where t is the time in seconds at
which one of the two subjects conceded). The subject that did not concede
earned their demand multiplied by the discount factor. Throughout the sec-
ond stage, subjects were shown a 2× 2 matrix. This displayed, in real-time,
the discounted payoffs to each player, both if they conceded at that moment
or if the other player conceded at that moment. During each session, sub-
jects were randomly rematched 15 times to provide subjects an opportunity
to gain experience with the game. Sessions lasted approximately one and a
half hours.26
Three treatments using the unrestricted design were conducted. These
varied the presence and demands of computer players in a session. As indi-
cated in table 1, the control treatment, referred to as C0, did not contain any
computer players, while the second and third treatments, referred to as U1
and U2 respectively, included two computer players in each session. In the
former, both computer players were programmed with a demand of 20; in the
latter, one computer player was programmed with a demand of 12, the other
20. Table 1 provides a summary of the sessions. Under the assumption that
the only behavioral types are the computer players introduced in U1 and
U2, the model would predict the following: while there would be no precise
prediction for the control, in U1 there would be only announcements of 20,
and in U2 there would be only announcements of 12 and 20.27
25See sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the online appendix for sample instructions and screen
shots.
26Subjects were recruited for up to 2 hours. In all sessions, all fifteen periods of bar-
gaining were completed within the scheduled time.
27See Tables 1 and 2 of the online appendix for precise numerical predictions. When
there are no behavioral types in the model, i.e. in the complete information case, there
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Session
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 Total
C0 Subjects 12 12 10 10 14 58
Computers . . . . .
Earnings ($) 25.0 23.3 23.0 19.0 20.7 22.2
U1 Subjects 14 14 14 14 14 70
Computers 20, 20 20, 20 20, 20 20, 20 20, 20
Earnings ($) 20.7 23.6 22.1 20.7 23.6 22.1
U2 Subjects 14 14 14 14 14 70
Computers 12, 20 12, 20 12, 20 12, 20 12, 20
Earnings ($) 22.1 25.0 27.9 23.6 29.3 25.6
R0 Subjects 10 16 16 16 12 70
Computers . . . . .
Earnings ($) 25.0 22.5 18.8 22.5 21.7 21.9
R3 Subjects 13 13 13 13 13 65
Computers 15, 18, 20 15, 18, 20 15, 18, 20 15, 18, 20 15, 18, 20
Earnings ($) 24.2 24.2 19.6 24.2 24.2 23.3
R4 Subjects 12 12 12 12 12 60
Computers 8, 15, 18, 20 8, 15, 18, 20 8, 15, 18, 20 8, 15, 18, 20 8, 15, 18, 20
Earnings ($) 25.0 25.0 20.0 23.3 25.0 23.7
Table 1: Summary of All Sessions
However, given the evidence from bargaining experiments for norm driven
behavior, it is reasonable to postulate that not all subjects who enter the
laboratory correspond to a rational type of the model.28 Since the exact
predictions of the model are dependent on the distribution of behavioral
types, the distribution of potential behavioral types amongst the population
of subjects must also be considered, along with any induced types. Despite
this complication, for many assumptions over such types moving from the
control to either U1 or U2 would imply an increase in the number of 20
demands, while the demand of the 12-computer would either not be mimicked
by rational subjects at all, or rarely so.
Table 2 gives the predictions of the model for several example scenar-
ios that include the possibility of subjects being irrational, which should be
viewed as complementary illustrations of this basic comparative static. First,
exists a continuum of equilibria. Therefore, the outcome of this control treatment must
be interpreted in conjunction with the other two treatments, where there are equilibrium
predictions irrespective of whether the computer players are the only behavioral types.
28This is somewhat in the spirit of the homemade beliefs of Camerer and Weigelt (1988),
although in the current context there is two-sided asymmetric information.
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z µ Prob. Observing§
Treatment z0 12 15 20 12 15 20 12 15 20
Scenario A1
C0 Assumed 92.3 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
U1 Predicted 80.0 0.0 6.7 13.3 0.0 53.4 46.6 0.0 57.0 43.0
U2 Predicted 80.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.0 69.0 31.0 0.0 71.4 28.6
Scenario B2
C0 Estimated 7.7 1.1 30.4 9.7 0.0 9.9 23.2 1.1 31.2 11.5
U1 Predicted 6.7 0.9 26.4 21.7 0.0 8.9 41.3 1.1 31.1 12.9
U2 Predicted 6.7 7.6 26.4 15.1 0.0 0.0 38.9 1.1 30.4 12.7
Scenario C3
C0 Estimated 61.5 1.1 7.1 3.6 0.0 39.4 12.7 1.1 31.4 11.4
U1 Predicted 53.3 0.9 6.2 16.5 0.0 24.2 40.9 1.1 22. 28.8
U2 Predicted 53.3 7.6 6.2 9.8 0.0 29.3 31.3 1.1 25.2 22.9
Scenario D4
C0 Estimated 92.3 0.5 1.2 1.0 0.0 69.2 15.4 0.5 65.1 15.2
U1 Predicted 80.0 0.4 1.0 14.2 5.5 13.4 75.4 5.5 13.6 70.6
U2 Predicted 80.0 7.1 1.0 7.5 17.2 18.5 57.1 16.3 18.3 53.7
Table 2: Example Rationality Scenarios
§ Probability of observing an announcement, excluding those made by computer players. All values in the
table are probabilities represented as percentages (for reference, 1
13
≈ 7.7% and 1
15
≈ 6.7%). The µ
columns do not sum to one in scenarios B, C and D since {12, 15, 20} does not include the entire support
of µ.
1 z15 assumed so that on average 1 out of 13 human players is a 15-type.
2 z estimated using announcement data, assuming z0 =
1
13
.
3 z estimated using announcement data, assuming z0 =
8
13
.
4 z estimated using announcement data, assuming z0 =
12
13
.
scenario A considers the possibility that on average one out of 13 subjects
brought into the laboratory acts like a 15−type.29 That is, they always de-
mand the 50−50 split and would never accept less. As the last set of columns
of the table shows, while the probability of observing an announcement of 12
by a subject is not predicted to change across the treatments, moving from
the control to either U1 or U2 should result in an increase in demands of
29In either U1 or U2, if on average one out of thirteen human players (i.e. subjects)
were a 15-type, then for a rational subject the probability of being matched to this 15-type
subject would be 1/15. This is because, along with the thirteen other human players, there
are also two computer players in the matching pool. In the control treatment, which does
not include the two computer players, this probability would be 113 . For this reason, the
various rationality scenarios consider different multiples of 113 for the distribution of types
in the subject population.
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20.30
Clearly it is unrealistic to assume ex-ante what types might be possible,
or considered possible, in the subject population. However, under the as-
sumptions of the model, announcement data from the control session can be
used to estimate the set of behavioral types and its distribution, identified
up to a given value for the probability of being matched to a rational player.
Indeed the model generates a strictly positive probability of observing any
demand for appropriately selected parameters, allowing us to recover the im-
plied distribution of behavioral types. Using these estimates, the implied
probability of demands of 12 and 20 in U1 and U2 can be predicted, and
the basic comparative static confirmed empirically for our specific data. The
results of this analysis are reported in Table 2 as scenarios B, C and D re-
spectively, where the first assumes a small probability of being matched to
a rational subject, the third a large probability and the second something
in between. The basic comparative static prediction for demands of 20 is
observed in all three scenarios. Only in scenario D is an increase in demands
of 12 predicted.31
In order to exert more experimental control over the set of possible be-
havioral types, a modified design, referred to as the restricted design, was
also used. These experiments were conducted in an identical manner to the
unrestricted design except for two important changes:
• Subjects were only permitted to announce a demand from a restricted
set of possible announcements. The finite set from which announce-
ments could be made was included in the instructions to ensure the set
was common knowledge amongst all participants.
• For each permitted announcement, a single computer player, for whom
that demand was their strategic posture, was included in the session.
Thus for each demand a strictly positive probability of being matched
with a behavioral player of this type was induced. From an experimen-
30This example is indicative of the more general scenario where 20 is not an element
of the behavioral types in the population. If z0 is not too small or if 20 is the most
demanding type, then 20 announcements should be observed in both U1 and U2, but not
in the control.
31This estimation strategy was conducted for values of z0 in
{
1
13 ,
2
13 , ...,
12
13
}
. The di-
rection of the comparative static for demands of 20 does not change with the various
assumptions on z0. Demands of 12 are only predicted to increase significantly with values
of z0 larger than
10
13 . See section 2.4 of the online appendix for further details.
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tal design perspective, this addition has the advantage of not creating
any asymmetry between the behavioral types, as would be the case if
computer players only played a strict subset of the announcements in
the restricted set.
Two treatments using this modified design were conducted. In the first, re-
ferred to as R3, the set of announcements was {15, 18, 20}; in the second, R4,
the set was {8, 15, 18, 20}. In addition, a control treatment for the restricted
design, referred to as R0, was run to provide a benchmark for observed be-
havior in R3 and R4. Subjects in R0 were able to make announcements from
the same set as R3, however, there were no computer players included.32 The
characteristics of each treatment are summarized in Table 1.
Demands of 15 and 20 were included in both treatments to capture key
aspects of the unrestricted design. These demands were the most common
choice in each treatment. Furthermore, the demand of 15, being the equal
split, is ex-ante the most natural candidate for a potential behavioral type
in the subject population. The 20 demand replicates the induced behavioral
type subjects were expected to mimic in the U1 and U2 treatments.
The demand of 18 is included to test further the announcement strategies
of subjects. This test is made using the R3 treatment, where all demands
are aggressive. If all subjects correspond to rational types then they should
mimic the 18-demand more often than the more aggressive 20-demand. Even
allowing for the possibility of behavioral type subjects, an observation of
significantly more 20 announcements than 18 announcements can only be
rationalized by the model if there are more 20-types in the subject population
than 18-types.
In the R4 treatment, a demand compatible with all other types, includ-
ing the most demanding type 20, was included. In equilibrium, the model
predicts that such demands of 8 should not be made by rational types. Con-
sequently, the inclusion of 8 permits some measure of the magnitude of a
potential demand induced effect resulting from including a computer type.
Furthermore, the presence of a demand for strictly less than half the pie
has implications for second stage concession behavior. In particular, rational
players making aggressive demands should concede initially with strictly pos-
itive probability to any announcement that is strictly less then their demand.
In R3 there should be no initial concession in equilibrium.
32We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a control treatment for
the restricted design.
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5 Results
Throughout this section, the analysis will focus on data from the last 10 pe-
riods involving non-computer players.33 For all statistical tests, two p-values
are reported. The first comes from a regression-based approach that uses
all observations and cluster-robust standard errors that allow for arbitrary
correlation between observations from the same session. These are denoted
by p. The second comes from an analogous non-parametric test that uses
session averages and is denoted by pn.
34
Table 3 summarizes outcomes from the bargaining process in the six treat-
ments. On average the difference between the points subjects earned across
treatments is small, with matches in the unrestricted design wasting more
of the pie. In each treatment the majority of matches enter a second stage;
for the U2 treatment and the two restricted design treatments with induced
types this rate is larger. To evaluate the performance of the model across the
treatments, subject behavior is examined in three specific areas: first-stage
announcements, second-stage delay and second-stage concession.
5.1 Announcements in the First Stage
In the unrestricted design sessions, there is a wide range of demands made in
the first stage. This heterogeneity is illustrated in figure 1. However, these
announcements are concentrated on a small subset of demands. Table 4
provides summary statistics for the key announcements. Adding the induced
33The first 5 periods are dropped as there is often an initial period of learning by
subjects. The overall conclusions of the results are not altered by including the first five
periods. Section 3 of the online appendix contains a replication of the main analyses using
all 15 periods of the data. For the analysis of second-stage data, only matches where both
players are human subjects are included.
34Section 3 of the online appendix contains a detailed description of all the reported
statistical tests. For the regression-based approach, the appropriate dependent variable is
regressed on treatment indicator variables. For first-stage data, a subject-level random-
effect is also included. To conduct inference, a t-test or Wald test, using robust standard
errors clustered at the session level, is calculated. The clustering is used to account for
the fact that subjects within a session are randomly matched between periods. The non-
parametric approach is also reported. For point predictions a two-sided sign-test is used;
for matched data, a two-sided signed-rank test, and for comparative statics, a two-sided
rank-sum test. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages – Fre´chette (2012)
for a discussion of some of these. Reporting both shows that our main results are robust
to the statistical approach.
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Treatment
C0 U1 U2 R0 R3 R4
Mean points per period 13.4 13.7 13.7 13.8 14.3 14.4
Percent of second stages 71.4 66.4 77.2 70.0 74.5 73.4
Percent of pie wasted 10.5 8.8 8.8 7.9 4.7 4.1
... conditional on second stage 14.7 13.3 11.4 11.3 6.3 5.5
Table 3: Summary of Bargaining Outcomes
20 type in both U1 and U2 results in a significant increase in the proportion
of announcements of 20 relative to the control sessions. Announcements
of 10, which are complementary to the induced 20 demand, also show a
significant increase in U1, and occur more frequently in that treatment than
announcements of the induced 12 demand do in U2.
Proportion of Announcements of
Treatment 8 10 12 15 18 20
C0 0.5 (3) 1.7 (10) 1.0 (6) 29.8 (173) 4.5 (26) 10.9 (63)
U1 0.7 (5) 9.3 (65) 2.0 (14) 20.7 (145) 1.4 (10) 25.1 (176)
p 0.630 0.000 0.215 0.307 0.018 0.044
pn 0.572 0.009 0.595 0.347 0.209 0.076
U2 0.4 (3) 1.9 (13) 4.0 (28) 17.4 (122) 4.7 (33) 31.9 (223)
p 0.819 0.873 0.053 0.152 0.897 0.000
pn 0.906 0.916 0.172 0.251 0.675 0.028
R0 . (.) . (.) . (.) 55.3 (387) 9.6 (67) 35.1 (246)
R3 . (.) . (.) . (.) 49.4 (321) 6.2 (40) 44.5 (289)
p . . . 0.460 0.117 0.181
pn . . . 0.465 0.172 0.347
R4 4.5 (27) . (.) . (.) 39.0 (234) 9.8 (59) 46.7 (280)
p . . . 0.005 0.925 0.065
pn . . . 0.076 0.917 0.346
Table 4: Summary of Key Announcements
Number of observations are given in parentheses.
The p-values give the significance of the difference between the control and the treatment listed in the prior row.
In the restricted design sessions, the vast majority of demands are for 15
or 20. In R0, demands of 15 are most frequent. In R4, demands of 20 occur
the most whereas there is a nearly equal rate of demands of 15 and 20 in R3.
In both of these treatments there are few announcements of 18 (less than
10%), and even fewer announcements of 8 in R4 (less than 5%).
Not only are demands of 18 infrequent in both R3 and R4, but on average
they lead to lower payoffs relative to demands of 15 and 20 [p, pn < 0.01].
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Figure 1: Subject Announcements in the Unrestricted Design
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This result is shown in Table 5, which presents the average points payoff
of subjects conditional on the announcement made.35 In the sessions with
induced types (treatments U1, U2, R3 and R4 ), announcements of 20 lead to
a greater payoff on average than announcements of 15 [p, pn < 0.01]. Making
concessionary announcements (i.e. for less than half the pie) lead to lower
payoffs on average [p, pn < 0.01]. There are no demands that on average lead
to more than half the pie.
Average Payoff to Announcements of
Treatment 8 10 12 15 18 20
C0 4.2 10.8 12.6 14.0 14.4 13.1
(2.85) (1.03) (0.95) (0.52) (1.02) (0.35)
U1 8.2 11.0 11.4 12.6 12.8 13.7
(0.25) (0.50) (1.07) (0.52) (0.63) (0.86)
U2 11.0 12.5 13.2 13.3 13.8 14.8
(1.64) (0.68) (0.46) (0.24) (0.36) (0.30)
R0 13.9 14.0 13.4
(0.21) (0.44) (0.44)
R3 12.8 11.5 14.4
(0.36) (0.55) (0.27)
R4 9.9 13.9 13.0 14.5
(0.28) (0.28) (0.39) (0.24)
Table 5: Average Payoffs in Points
Parentheses give robust standard deviations, clustered at the session level.
5.2 Delay in the Second Stage
The expected delay in a subgame following the announcement of incompati-
ble demands should be less than 1
λHL+λLH
(where αH ≥ αL), conditional on
there eventually being agreement. Unlike equilibrium expected delay in a
subgame, this bound gives a prediction for delay in a subgame that holds
irrespective of the distribution of behavioral types. As a result, the analy-
sis is not dependent on either assumptions over the distribution or on the
35Note that these expected payoffs are only predicted to be equal if the announcements
are part of the equilibrium mixing strategy and if all subjects are assumed to correspond to
rational types. That this prediction depends on assuming all subjects are rational differs
from the previous analysis of this subsection and the analysis that will follow in subsections
5.2 and 5.3, where the tested predictions are not dependent on such an assumption.
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estimation of this distribution.36 Table 6 presents summary information on
delay in the second stage, in particular comparing the mean delay to this up-
per bound for subgames with at least 15 observations. The observed delays
are significantly longer than their respective upper bounds for all treatments
[p, pn < 0.01]. This result is emphasized by looking at the last column of
table 6, which gives the average ratio of mean delay to upper bound. The
smallest value of this ratio is 3.17, which is observed in R4. This means that,
on average, the mean delay in any given subgame of R4 is more than triple
its respective bound.
Subgame§ Obs Delay (Seconds)
Treatment αL αH Freq % Mean Bound Ratio
§§
C0 All 180 248.1 5.80
15 20 17 9.4 162.5 20.0
U1 All 162 202.7 6.61
15 20 32 19.8 51.9 20.0
20 20 24 14.8 378.2 50.0
U2 All 183 131.8 7.50
15 20 29 15.8 93.6 20.0
20 20 27 14.8 92.2 50.0
R0 All 245 159.3 5.84
15 18 38 15.5 64.0 11.1
15 20 139 56.7 103.4 20.0
18 20 27 11.0 209.9 36.4
20 20 40 16.3 406.1 50.0
R3 All 193 69.0 4.53
15 20 119 61.7 53.2 20.0
18 20 16 8.3 135.8 36.4
20 20 49 25.4 87.0 50.0
R4 All 160 60.9 3.17
15 18 15 9.4 25.4 11.1
15 20 73 45.6 26.1 20.0
18 20 17 10.6 93.3 36.4
20 20 51 31.9 111.8 50.0
Table 6: Second-Stage Delay
§ Only subgames with at least 15 observations reported.
§§ Weighted (frequency) average of mean delay divided by bound.
Contrasting the performance across designs, mean delay comes closer to
36As will become clear in the analysis that follows, this upper bound will be consistently
violated by the data. As a consequence, the same conclusions would hold for equilibrium
expected delay, irrespective of the assumptions or estimates used to calculate them.
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the bounds dictated by the model in the restricted design: the delay to
bound ratio is smaller at 4.70, compared to 6.64 in the unrestricted design.
The difference between the designs is particularly notable for treatments with
computer players – that is, U1 and U2 versus R3 and R4 – and is significant
[p, pn < 0.05]. However, this difference is statistically insignificant if only
explicit subgames are used – that is, subgames involving announcements
that might have been made by a computer or announcements of 15 [p, pn >
0.1].37 Comparing treatments within the restricted design provides further
evidence that explicit subgames have lower delays [p, pn < 0.01]. Despite
the indications of a better performance in these explicit subgames, and the
restricted design in general, the observed delay is still consistently above that
predicted by the model, suggesting that subjects are engaging in excessively
costly second-stage delays.38
5.3 Concession in the Second Stage
The model imposes structure on the pattern of concession behavior. Rational
subjects will either always concede instantly, if the demand made by the other
player is not mimicked in the first stage, or employ a mixed strategy over
the time to concession. In the latter case, excluding the possibility of initial
concession, the player who made the lower demand is more likely to concede,
but should never concede initially.
The top panel of figure 2 presents the probability that either player con-
cedes for asymmetric subgames with at least 15 observations in the unre-
stricted design.39 In these sessions, it is not clear that interior concession
is in line with the predictions of the model. In the control sessions, the
subject making the higher announcement is actually observed to concede
more often. While the two treatments with computer players have a sig-
nificantly larger probability of concession by the lower-announcer than the
37For U1, only the subgames 15-20 and 20-20 are explicit; for U2, 12-20, 15-20 and
20-20. For R3 and R4 all subgames are explicit by design. For C0 and R0, none of the
subgames are explicit since there are no computer players, and an announcement pair of
15-15 does not result in a second-stage.
38See section 3.3 of the online appendix for further evidence of excessive delays.
39Attention is restricted to asymmetric subgames since only these have a clear theoretical
prediction. In the analysis presented here, initial concession is represented by concession
within the first 2 seconds. Interior concession is represented by concession outside the first
2 seconds. Results are robust to small changes in the specific cutoff; see section 3.4 of the
online appendix for further details.
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control [p, pn < 0.05], it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the
probability is less than or equal to that for the higher-announcer. As with
delay, concession behavior in explicit subgames is overall closer to the pattern
predicted by the theory than that in other subgames [p < 0.01, pn < 0.1].
With respect to initial concession behavior, there is little evidence that play-
ers concede initially in any of the unrestricted design treatments, despite a
non-aggressive type being induced in U2 and a complementary type emerging
in U1.
The bottom panel of figure 2 presents the data on concession behavior
for the restricted design. First, the model predicts that the player who made
the higher announcement should concede initially in R4, but should never do
so in R3. Second, excluding initial concession, the player making the lower
announcement should be more likely to concede in both treatments. These
predictions are observed in the figure: In R3, the lower-announcer is observed
conceding more often in both the initial and interior panels. In R4, while
the lower-announcer continues to concede more often in the interior panel, it
is the higher-announcer that is observed to concede initially more often, as
predicted. However, while these observations are all in the direction predicted
by the model, only the initial concession comparative static is statistically
significant in one of the two types of test [p < 0.01, pn > 0.1].
Finally, in the restricted design it is clear that behavior in explicit sub-
games is significantly closer to the predicted pattern – that is, behavior in
the R3 and R4 treatments, where all demands corresponded to an induced
type, is much closer to the predicted pattern than is the case in R0, where
there are no induced types. In particular, interior concession in R0 is sig-
nificantly less likely to be by the lower-announcer than is the case in R3
and R4 [p, pn < 0.01]. Furthermore, it is possible to reject the hypothesis
that the lower-announcer is more likely to concede than the higher-announcer
[p < 0.01, pn > 0.1], something that is not possible in any of the treatments
with computer players.
6 Discussion
Bargaining Outcomes
As a benchmark, the results from the control sessions share both similari-
ties and differences with results from prior bargaining experiments. In our
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experiment, about one-third of demands are for half of the pie. Although
this is not a negligible number, it is much less than the 100% observed in
the comparable treatment of Roth and Malouf (1979). We do observe more
conflict than is typical, with 71.4% of first-stage demands being incompatible
and resulting in some delay. In a review of prior experiments discussed in
Roth (1995), inefficient outcomes in comparable ultimatum and shrinking-pie
games are observed at most 42% of the time (based on numbers from Forsythe
et al. 1991). However, since incompatible first-stage demands do not imply
outright disagreement in our environment, another interesting comparison is
the fraction of the pie that is destroyed. We find 10.5% of the pie is lost to
delay, a percentage that is comparable to these prior studies. To summarize,
subjects in our implementation regularly adopted adversarial positions dur-
ing the bargaining process, but on average avoided wasting too much of the
available pie.
Recognizing the Role of Reputation
The first prediction the experimental design sought to investigate was if sub-
jects recognize the role of reputation in this environment. To this end, the
unrestricted design aimed to test if players would mimic obstinate types while
imposing the minimum possible restriction on subject announcement behav-
ior. The comparison between first-stage announcements in the control and
those in sessions with induced types provides support for this prediction:
following the introduction of an experimentally induced 20-type, there is a
substantial increase in demands of 20. In moving away from the dominant
announcement of 15 from the control, subjects display a willingness to give
up an allocation that is not only equitable and efficient, but also the strong
50-50 norm of this symmetric bargaining environment.
This observation is reminiscent of results from earlier unstructured bar-
gaining experiments. For example, in experiments with bargaining over lot-
tery points, Roth et al. (1981) found that when one player has a lower prize
in the final lottery than the other – and this is common knowledge to both
parties – subjects would tend to negotiate over an equal expected-value allo-
cation or an equal lottery-points allocation. The former allocation requires
giving more lottery points to the disadvantaged player to equate expected
payoffs, while the latter implies a higher expected value for the advantaged
player. Significantly, the player with the higher lottery payoff was more likely
to suggest the equal lottery-points allocation, thus using an available notion
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of fairness in a strategic manner. The differences with our implementation
are that there is a precise theoretical prediction concerning the strategies
bargainers should take, and the behavior subjects are predicted to imitate
cannot be interpreted as fair.
Our findings also parallel a growing body of research that investigates
the extent to which subjects will behave in a more self-interested manner
when they are given a means by which to hide their intentions. For example,
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) find that the observability of the dictator’s
choice affects the frequency of equal splits in the dictator game. They show
that, when there is the possibility that the dictator’s choice might be switched
for another, unequal allocation, the dictator is more likely to offer this un-
equal split than when such an intervention is not possible. Dana et al. (2006)
and Dana et al. (2007) document similar behavior with their variants of the
dictator game. In our experiments, we find comparable behavior in a strate-
gic environment, with subjects using the presence of computer players to
move away from the prevalent 50-50 norm, even though such an action may
lead to conflict in a second stage. The fact that the environment is strategic
is a substantive difference, not least since there is no possible conflict that
could result from subjects taking the more self-interested action in these dic-
tator games. This is not the case with the stylized bargaining game where an
aggressive demand will most likely lead to conflict, making it far from clear
that subjects would have been willing to follow such strategies.
In their implementations of the ultimatum game with asymmetric infor-
mation, Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) and Gu¨th et al. (1996) find evidence
that proposers are inclined to hide behind the possibility of a small pie.
That is, when responders do not know the size of the amount to be divided,
proposers make offers that would correspond to a fair offer if this amount
were smaller than it really is. As with earlier unstructured bargaining, these
experiments show subjects are willing to use available fairness norms in a
strategic manner. While these environments are strategic, the nature of the
interaction remains substantively different, as is the interpretation of the
mimicking behavior of subjects: the stylized game is symmetric with two-
sided incomplete information, and mimicking the demands of the induced
types has no possibility of being a fair offer.
One aspect of our results that differs substantially from the early stud-
ies of reputation, in particular Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Jung et al.
(1994), is that - to the extent that they found results in line with the sequen-
tial equilibrium prediction - many repetitions or experienced subjects were
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needed. In our experiment, subjects displayed mimicking behavior from the
early periods. In their study of one-sided reputation, Grosskopf and Sarin
(2010) also find behavior consistent with reputation building without need-
ing many repetitions.40 However, their results suggest that the theoretical
predictions of reputation effects are more likely to be borne out when such
effects are aligned with the prevalent other-regarding preferences of the envi-
ronment; for example, when the reputation effect requires an honest action
rather than a dishonest one. This is in contrast to our results, where subjects
are observed building reputation as a type demanding strictly more than the
50-50 split (the prevalent norm), despite this split always being an available
alternative.
Further Analysis of Announcement Strategies
Several other features of subject behavior warrant further discussion. First,
in the U1 sessions, not only is there an increase in 20 announcements com-
pared to the control, but also the introduction of two 20 type computers leads
to an increase in demands of 10.41 Such demands are complementary to the
induced type in that they ensure that a second stage will not be reached.
Note that a rational player of the model would strictly prefer to announce
15 rather than 10, even if they knew with probability one that a player an-
nouncing 20 is a behavioral type: should they encounter an announcement of
20 they could always concede instantly, thus giving themselves a payoff of at
least 10. This alternative strategy would not involve any delay and guarantee
at least as high a payoff. Consequently, the presence of complementary types
suggests that some subjects are willing to accept an inferior payoff in order
to avoid the process of negotiation altogether. Although the model used in
this paper does not predict an increase in such a type, the coexistence of
complementary pairs, such as 10 and 20, is an outcome of the evolutionary
stability analysis of Abreu and Sethi (2003).42
Second, there is support for the conjecture that subjects mimic the most
aggressive demand too often. As shown in table 4, there are significantly more
40A common feature of these two designs is the use of computer players, rather than
subjects with dominant strategies, to induce reputational types.
41Such complementary types did not emerge in significant numbers in the U2 treatment.
42While it is unlikely that evolution of behavior is being observed within the short time
frame of these experiments, it is interesting to note that such a model captures something
that is observed in the laboratory.
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announcements of 20 than 18 in the R3 treatment. This observation can only
be rationalized by the model if there are more 20-types in the population
than 18-types. Ex-ante, since 15 is the fair split, it seems reasonable to
have expected more 15-types in the population than either 18- or 20-types.
However, there does not appear to be any reason to expect more 20-types
than 18-types.43
Third, the inclusion of a concessionary announcement of 8 in the R4
treatment provides a marker for the size of any potential demand-induced
effects. Announcements of 8 should never be mimicked by rational subjects.
As table 4 shows, such demands were made less than 5% of the time, suggest-
ing demand-induced effects are minimal. A related result is that demands
of 12 in the U2 treatment are of the same order, which is in line with the
basic comparative static as discussed in section 4, reinforcing the evidence
that demand-induced effects are of a second order.
Role of an Explicit Set of Types
In both the U1 and U2 treatments, rational subjects knew for certain that
demands of 20 could be from an irrational player. It is also plausible that
they would expect some subjects to insist on getting half of the pie, a demand
of 15, since it is such a salient norm. In these treatments, it is when these
two demands meet that second-stage concession behavior comes closer to the
predicted pattern. This observation is replicated more precisely using the
restricted design, where second-stage behavior is closer to the predictions of
the model when the set of behavioral types is explicit – compare R3 and R4
with R0 in Table 6 and Figure 2. In particular, while subjects make demands
for more than half of the pie in R0, their subsequent concession behavior
suggests that such bargaining positions prove to lack credibility since, when
they meet a 50-50 demand, they end up waiting longer but being more likely
to concede in the end. Taken together, these results suggest that uncertainty
over the set of behavioral types is responsible for a significant proportion
of the observed departures from the theory, especially in the unrestricted
design.
43In addition, as will be discussed below, the evidence from second-stage behavior in
R0 suggest that, without the presence of a 20-computer player, demanding 20 is not a
credible bargaining position.
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Remaining Deviations and Extensions of the Theory
While part of the identified deviations can be accounted for by uncertainty
over the set of behavioral types, some remain: there is evidence that sub-
jects make 20 announcements too often in R3 and remain in the concession
stage too long in both R3 and R4. It is, however, worth stressing that the
quantitative details of the sequential equilibrium predictions are complicated.
Subjects are required to employ not only a mixed strategy over first-stage an-
nouncements, but also a mixed strategy over concession time, all calibrated
to ensure their (rational-type) opponent is indifferent over their respective
choices.
Overall, prior experiments suggest that subjects might have difficulties
implementing such strategies. Although there is quite some evidence from
market entry games that aggregate behavior tends to converge to the (mixed-
strategy) Nash equilibrium predictions (for example Erev and Rapoport 1998,
Rapoport et al. 2000, Duffy and Hopkins 2005), a number of studies (such
as Shachat 2002) have noted that subjects find mixed strategies difficult to
implement at an individual level. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Jung
et al. (1994), who find support for the sequential equilibrium in their studies
of reputation, also report evidence that subjects do not mix in the correct
proportions.44 Consequently, it is not too surprising to find deviations with
respect to these details. However, the systematic nature of those identi-
fied are informative, and suggest some possible modifications to the baseline
theory.
One extreme assumption of the model is that behavioral types never
concede. In line with the model, this is how we programmed our computer
players to behave. However, it seems unreasonable to suppose that subjects
that are strategically unresponsive would be so inflexible as to never concede
no matter how much the pie has already shrunk. Including the possibility
that obstinate, 50-50 types from the subject population might eventually
concede results in both greater delay, conditional on eventual agreement, and
an increase in more demanding announcements. Thus, a minor modification
to the theory brings the finer details of the equilibrium closer to the observed
44Delaying concession for too long has also been observed in all pay auctions, a setting
with arguably a simpler strategy for subjects to implement: rather than mixing over
concession times, they play a pure strategy following the random draw from their cost
function.
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behavior.45
This approach to extending the theory focussed on a minimal adjustment
to the behavior of the obstinate, “irrational”, types in order to accommodate
the observed deviations from the baseline theory; one that reflects the nature
of the experimental design. An alternative would be to adjust the preferences
of the rational types, for example to incorporate social preferences or fairness
goals. A similar analysis can be conducted to see if a small change to pref-
erences might move the predictions of the theory in the direction suggested
by the experiment. Assuming that the change does not result in drastically
different behavior by rational types in the concession stage, modifications
that make concession less appealing for players making more demanding an-
nouncements, would achieve this goal.46 In contrast, modifications where
the main effect is to make concession less appealing to players making lower
announcements – for example, envy or spite from those announcing the 50-50
split when they meet unfair opponents – are likely to result in ambiguous
predictions for delay and first-stage announcements.
7 Conclusions
In implementing the stylized model of Abreu and Gul (2000), the experiments
presented in this paper investigate behavior in a setting that underlies a gen-
eral class of bargaining environments. In using the stylized game, the design
has the advantage of eliminating a potential confound on bargaining power,
namely proposer power, that arises in other protocols. The experiments focus
on the role played by reputation, while providing the structure needed for
testable predictions on players’ strategies. At the core of these predictions
is the need to mimic the demands of obstinate players: for a player to do
otherwise would reveal rationality and lead to a weak bargaining position.
We find clear evidence that subjects recognize this role for reputation and
mimic the induced obstinate types. We also find evidence for the presence
45This modification is in the spirit of the perturbation of the standard alternating-offers
bargaining given in Binmore and Swierzbinski (2006). See Sections 4.1-4.3 of the online
appendix for further details.
46See Section 4.4 of the online appendix for further details. An example of such a
modification would be to suppose that players who announce 20 in the first stage suffer
a small utility cost of shame if they concede to a fair announcement in the second stage.
We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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of complementary types, something not predicted by this model, but consis-
tent with an evolutionary view of the environment. Complementary types
will acquiesce to credibly obstinate demands, rather than go through the
negotiation process to reach an agreement.
While the qualitative predictions of the first stage of the model are borne
out in the laboratory, some of the finer details of the sequential equilibrium
predictions are not: there is a tendency to make more demanding announce-
ments too often and to remain in the concession stage too long. These devi-
ations are not surprising given the complexities of the sequential equilibrium
and prior experimental evidence demonstrating the difficulties subjects have
in implementing mixed strategies. What is surprising is that these deviations
are all in the direction of more conflict, inequality and inefficiency, which is
in contrast to much of the bargaining literature that generally reports devia-
tions that work in the opposite direction. We propose a minor modification to
the assumed behavior of unresponsive types that would result in predictions
with more demanding first-stage announcements and greater delay. Finally,
the performance of the model improved markedly in sessions with the re-
stricted design and induced types, where second-stage behavior come closer
to the predicted pattern. These observations indicate the importance of hav-
ing an explicit set of behavioral types for empirical applications, as well as
the theory. Results from sessions without such explicit types suggest that,
should the set of behavioral types not be evident to bargaining parties, the
process by which such behavioral play becomes credible needs to be modeled
directly.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that indi-
viduals behave strategically in bargaining environments, even when such be-
havior is in opposition to the strong norms of equality and efficiency. At first
glance, this observation appears to be in sharp contrast to the results from
other bargaining experiments, where subjects are generally only observed
to behave strategically if their behavior coincides with a plausible norm of
fairness. However, our results are consistent with an increasing body of re-
search that has investigated the role of intentions in decision making. In
mimicking the induced types, we observe subjects willing to take an adver-
sarial stance in their first-stage announcements, despite this being contrary
to the prevalent other-regarding preference and possibly leading to conflict
in a subsequent round. Undoubtedly, more research is needed to understand
further the extent to which the Abreu and Gul (2000) model can be used to
predict behavior in bargaining situations. Nonetheless, our results indicate
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that this two-sided reputation approach is an appropriate tool for investigat-
ing bargaining behavior, particularly in environments where the possibilities
for norm-driven or obstinate play are transparent to all actors.
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